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Does the quantum state represent reality or our knowledge of reality? In making this distinction
precise, we are led to a novel classification of hidden variable models of quantum theory. Indeed,
representatives of each class can be found among existing constructions for two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces. Our approach also provides a fruitful new perspective on arguments for the nonlocality and
incompleteness of quantum theory. Specifically, we show that for models wherein the quantum state
has the status of something real, the failure of locality can be established through an argument
considerably more straightforward than Bell’s theorem. The historical significance of this result
becomes evident when one recognizes that the same reasoning is present in Einstein’s preferred
argument for incompleteness, which dates back to 1935. This fact suggests that Einstein was
seeking not just any completion of quantum theory, but one wherein quantum states are solely
representative of our knowledge. Our hypothesis is supported by an analysis of Einstein’s attempts
to clarify his views on quantum theory and the circumstance of his otherwise puzzling abandonment
of an even simpler argument for incompleteness from 1927.
I. INTRODUCTION
We explore a distinction among hidden variable mod-
els of quantum theory that has hitherto not been suffi-
ciently emphasized, namely, whether the quantum state
is considered to be ontic or epistemic. We call a hid-
den variable model ψ-ontic if every complete physical
state or ontic state [1] in the theory is consistent with
only one pure quantum state; we call it ψ-epistemic if
there exist ontic states that are consistent with more
than one pure quantum state. In ψ-ontic models, dis-
tinct quantum states correspond to disjoint probability
distributions over the space of ontic states, whereas in
ψ-epistemic models, there exist distinct quantum states
that correspond to overlapping probability distributions.
Only in the latter case can the quantum state be consid-
ered to be truly epistemic, that is, a representation of an
observer’s knowledge of reality rather than reality itself.
(This distinction will be explained in detail further on.)
It is interesting to note that, to the authors’ knowl-
edge, all mathematically explicit hidden variable models
proposed to date are ψ-ontic (with the exception of a pro-
posal by Kochen and Specker [2] that only works for a
two-dimensional Hilbert space and which we will discuss
further on).1 The study of ψ-epistemic hidden variable
models is the path less traveled in the hidden variable
research program. This is unfortunate given that recent
work has shown how useful the assumption of hidden
1 Subtleties pertaining to Nelson’s mechanics and unconventional
takes on the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation will also be discussed
in due course.
variables can be for explaining a variety of quantum phe-
nomena if one adopts a ψ-epistemic approach [3, 4, 5, 6].
It will be useful for us to contrast hidden variable mod-
els with the interpretation that takes the quantum state
alone to be a complete description of reality. We call
the latter the ψ-complete view, although it is sometimes
referred to as the orthodox interpretation2.
Arguments against the ψ-complete view and in favor of
hidden variables have a long history. Among the most fa-
mous are those that were provided by Einstein. Although
he did not use the term ‘hidden variable interpretation’,
it is generally agreed that such an interpretation cap-
tures his approach. Indeed, Einstein had attempted to
construct a hidden variable model of his own (although
ultimately he did not publish this work) [7, 8]. One of the
questions we address in this article is whether Einstein
favored either of the two sorts of hidden variable theories
we have outlined above: ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic. Experts
in the quantum foundations community have long recog-
nized that Einstein had already shown a failure of locality
for the ψ-complete view with a very simple argument at
the Solvay conference in 1927 [9]. It is also well-known
in such circles that a slightly more complicated argument
given in 1935— one appearing in his correspondence with
Schro¨dinger, not the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper —
2 Note that while Bohr argued for the completeness of the quantum
state, he did so within the context of an instrumentalist rather
than a realist approach and consequently his view is not the
one that we are interested in examining here. Despite this, the
realist ψ-complete view we have in mind does approximate well
the views of many researchers today who identify themselves as
proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation.
2provided yet another way to see that locality was ruled
out for the ψ-complete view3 [11, 12]. What is not typ-
ically recognized, and which we show explicitly here, is
that the latter argument was actually strong enough to
also rule out locality for ψ-ontic hidden variable theo-
ries. In other words, Einstein showed that not only is
locality inconsistent with ψ being a complete description
of reality, it is also inconsistent with ψ being ontic, that
is, inconsistent with the notion that ψ represents real-
ity even in an incomplete sense. Einstein thus provided
an argument for the epistemic character of ψ based on
locality.
Fuchs has previously argued in favor of this conclu-
sion. In his words, “[Einstein] was the first person to say
in absolutely unambiguous terms why the quantum state
should be viewed as information [...]. His argument was
simply that a quantum-state assignment for a system can
be forced to go one way or the other by interacting with
a part of the world that should have no causal connection
with the system of interest.” [13]. One of the main goals
of the present article is to lend further support to this
thesis by clarifying the relevant concepts and by under-
taking a more detailed exploration of Einstein’s writings.
We also investigate the implications of our analysis for
the history of incompleteness and nonlocality arguments
in quantum theory.
In particular, our analysis helps to shed light on an
interesting puzzle regarding the evolution of Einstein’s
arguments for incompleteness.
The argument Einstein gave at the 1927 Solvay confer-
ence requires only a single measurement to be performed,
whereas from 1935 onwards he adopted an argument re-
quiring a measurement to be chosen from two possibili-
ties. Why did Einstein complicate the argument in this
way? Indeed, as has been noted by many authors, this
complication was actually detrimental to the effective-
ness of the argument, given that most of the criticisms
directed against the two-measurement form of the argu-
ment (Bohr’s included) focus upon his use of counterfac-
tual reasoning, an avenue that is not available in the 1927
version [14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
The notion that Einstein introduced this two-
measurement complication in order to simultaneously
beat the uncertainty principle, though plausible, is not
supported by textual evidence. Although the Einstein-
Podolsky Rosen (EPR) paper does take aim at the un-
certainty principle, it was written by Podolsky and, by
Einstein’s own admission, did not provide an accurate
synopsis of his (Einstein’s) views. This has been empha-
sized by Fine [12] and Howard [19]. In the versions of the
argument that were authored by Einstein, such as those
appearing in his correspondence with Schro¨dinger, the
uncertainty principle is explicitly de-emphasized. More-
3 Borrowing a phrase from Asher Peres [10], these facts are “well
known to those who know things well”.
over, to the authors’ knowledge, whenever Einstein sum-
marizes his views on incompleteness in publications or in
his correspondence after 1935, it is the argument appear-
ing in his correspondence with Schro¨dinger, rather than
the EPR argument, to which he appeals.
We suggest a different answer to the puzzle. Einstein
consistently used his more complicated 1935 argument
in favor of his simpler 1927 one because the extra com-
plication bought a stronger conclusion, namely, that the
quantum state is not just incomplete, but epistemic. We
suggest that Einstein implicitly recognized this fact, even
though he failed to emphasize it adequately.
Finally, our results demonstrate that one doesn’t need
the “big guns” of Bell’s theorem [20] to rule out local-
ity for any theories in which ψ is given ontic status;
more straightforward arguments suffice. Bell’s argument
is only necessary to rule out locality for ψ-epistemic hid-
den variable theories. It is therefore surprising that the
latter sort of hidden variable theory, despite being the
most difficult to prove inconsistent with locality and de-
spite being the last, historically, to have been subject to
such a proof, appears to have somehow attracted the least
attention, with Einstein a notable but lonely exception
to the rule.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ψ-ONTIC
AND ψ-EPISTEMIC ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
A. What is an ontological model?
We begin by defining some critical notions. First is
that of an ontological model of a theory. Our definition
will require that the theory be formulated operationally,
which is to say that the primitives of description are sim-
ply preparation and measurement procedures – lists of
instructions of what to do in the lab. The goal of an oper-
ational formulation of a theory is simply to prescribe the
probabilities of the outcomes of different measurements
given different preparation procedures, that is, the prob-
ability p(k|M,P ) of obtaining outcome k in measurement
M given preparation P. For instance, in an operational
formulation of quantum theory, every preparation P is
associated with a density operator ρ on Hilbert space,
and every measurement M is associated with a positive
operator valued measure (POVM) {Ek}. (In special
cases, these may be associated with vectors in Hilbert
space and Hermitian operators respectively.) The proba-
bility of obtaining outcome k is given by the generalized
Born rule, p(k|M,P ) = Tr(ρEk).
In an ontological model of an operational theory, the
primitives of description are the properties of microscopic
systems. A preparation procedure is assumed to prepare
a system with certain properties and a measurement pro-
cedure is assumed to reveal something about those prop-
erties. A complete specification of the properties of a
system is referred to as the ontic state of that system, and
is denoted by λ. The ontic state space is denoted by Λ. It
3is presumed that an observer who knows the preparation
P may nonetheless have incomplete knowledge of λ. In
other words, the observer may assign a non-sharp proba-
bility distribution p(λ|P ) over Λ when the preparation is
known to be P. Similarly, the model may be such that the
ontic state λ determines only the probability p(k|λ,M)
of different outcomes k for the measurementM. We shall
refer to p(λ|P ) as an epistemic state, because it charac-
terizes the observer’s knowledge of the system. We shall
refer to p(k|λ,M), considered as a function of λ, as an
indicator function. For the ontological model to repro-
duce the predictions of the operational theory, it must
reproduce the probability of k given M and P through
the formula
∫
dλp(k|M,λ)p(λ|P ) = p(k|M,P ).
An ontological model of quantum theory is therefore
defined as follows.
Definition 1 An ontological model of operational quan-
tum theory posits an ontic state space Λ and prescribes a
probability distribution over Λ for every preparation pro-
cedure P , denoted p(λ|P ), and a probability distribution
over the different outcomes k of a measurement M for
every ontic state λ ∈ Λ, denoted p(k|λ,M). Finally, for
all P and M, it must satisfy,
∫
dλp(k|M,λ)p(λ|P ) = tr (ρEk) , (1)
where ρ is the density operator associated with P and Ek
is the POVM element associated with outcome k of M .
The structure of the posited Λ encodes the kind of real-
ity envisaged by the model, while p(λ|P ) and p(k|M,λ)
specify what can be known and inferred by observers.
Note that we refer to preparation and measurement pro-
cedures rather than quantum states and POVMs because
we wish to allow for the possibility of contextual4 onto-
logical models [1].
Note that although the ontological model framework
proposed here is very general, there could exist realist
interpretations of quantum theory that are not suited to
it. However, the vast majority of models analyzed so
far seem compatible with it (or a simple extension to be
given in [21]).
B. Classifying ontological models of quantum
theory: heuristics
An important feature of an ontological model is how
it takes the quantum states describing a system to be
4 In a preparation (measurement) contextual ontological model,
different preparation (measurement) procedures corresponding
to the same density operator (POVM) may be assigned different
epistemic states (indicator functions) by the ontological model.
a) ψ-complete
Complete state is ψ
c) ψ−epistemic
ψ
b) ψ-supplemented
Complete state is λ=(ψ, ω)
Complete state is λ
ψ
ω
ψ
λ
FIG. 1: Schematic view of the ontic state space for (a) ψ-
complete models, (b) ψ-supplemented models and (c) ψ-
epistemic models.
related to the ontic states of that system. The sim-
plest possibility is a one-to-one relation.5 A schematic of
such a model is presented in part (a) of Fig. 1, where we
have represented the set of all quantum states by a one-
dimensional ontic state space Λ labeled by ψ. We refer
to such models as ψ-complete because a pure quantum
state provides a complete description of reality. Many
might consider this to be the ‘orthodox’ interpretation.
Of course, the ontological model framework also allows
for the possibility that a complete description of reality
may require supplementing the quantum state with ad-
ditional variables. Such variables are commonly referred
to as ‘hidden’ because their value is typically presumed
to be unknown to someone who knows the identity of the
quantum state. In such models, knowledge of ψ alone
provides only an incomplete description of reality.
The ontic state space for such a model is schematized
in part (b) of Fig. 1. Although there may be an arbi-
trary number of hidden variables, we indicate only a sin-
gle hidden variable ω in our diagram, represented by an
additional axis in the ontic state space Λ. Specification
of the complete ontic configuration of a system (a point
λ ∈ Λ) now requires specifying both ψ and the hidden
variable ω. We refer to models wherein ψ must be supple-
mented by hidden variables as ψ-supplemented. Almost
all ontological models of quantum mechanics constructed
to date have fallen into this class. For example, in the
conventional view of the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation
[22, 23], the complete ontic state is given by ψ together
with (that is, supplemented by) the positions of all parti-
5 Note that it is because of such models, wherein nothing is hid-
den to one who knows the quantum state, that we adopt the
term “ontological model” as opposed to “hidden variable model”.
Some authors might prefer to use the latter term on the grounds
that a ψ-complete model is simply a trivial instance of a hidden
variable model, but we feel that such a terminology would be
confusing.
4cles. The ontic nature of ψ in the deBroglie-Bohm inter-
pretation is clear from the fact that it plays the role of a
pilot wave, so that distinct ψs describe physically distinct
universes. Bell’s ‘beable’ interpretations [24] and modal
interpretations of quantum mechanics [25, 26, 27, 28] also
take ψ to be a sort of pilot wave and thus constitute ψ-
supplemented models 6. As another example, Belifante’s
survey of hidden variable theories [29] considers only ψ-
supplemented models.
There is a different way in which ψ could be an incom-
plete description of reality: it could represent a state of
incomplete knowledge about reality. In other words, it
could be that ψ is not a variable in the ontic state space
at all, but rather encodes a probability distribution over
the ontic state space. In this case also, specifying ψ does
not completely specify the ontic state, and so it is apt to
say that ψ provides an incomplete description. In such a
model, a variation of ψ does not represent a variation in
any physical degrees of freedom, but instead a variation
in the space of possible ways of knowing about some un-
derlying physical degrees of freedom. This is illustrated
schematically in part (c) of Fig. 1. We refer to such mod-
els as ψ-epistemic.7
C. Classifying ontological models of quantum
theory: a more rigorous approach
It will be convenient for our purposes to provide pre-
cise definitions of ψ-complete, ψ-supplemented, and ψ-
epistemic models in terms of the epistemic states that
are associated with different ψ. In other words, for each
model, we enquire about the probability distribution over
the ontic state space that is assigned by an observer who
knows that the preparation procedure is associated with
the quantum state ψ. Despite appearances, this does not
involve any loss of generality. For instance, although it
might appear that ψ-complete models can only be defined
by their ontological claims, namely, that pure quantum
states are associated one-to-one with ontic states, such
claims can always be re-phrased as epistemic claims, in
this case, that knowing the quantum state to be ψ im-
plies having a state of complete knowledge about the on-
tic state.
We now provide precise definitions of two distinctions
among ontological models from which one can extract
the three categories introduced in Sec. II B. The first
distinction is between models that are ψ-complete and
those that are not.
6 Note that another way in which to express how ψ-complete and
ψ-supplemented models differ from ψ-epistemic models is that
only in the former is ψ itself a beable [24]
7 There is, however, a subtlety in ensuring that a probability dis-
tribution associated with ψ is truly epistemic; we address this
issue shortly.
Definition 2 An ontological model is ψ-complete if the
ontic state space Λ is isomorphic to the projective Hilbert
space PH (the space of rays of Hilbert space) and if every
preparation procedure Pψ associated in quantum theory
with a given ray ψ is associated in the ontological model
with a Dirac delta function centered at the ontic state λψ
that is isomorphic to ψ, p(λ|Pψ) = δ(λ− λψ).8
Hence, in such models, the only feature of the prepara-
tion that is important is the pure quantum state to which
it is associated. Epistemic states for a pair of prepara-
tions associated with distinct quantum states are illus-
trated schematically in part (a) of Fig. 2.9
Definition 3 If an ontological model is not ψ-complete,
then it is said to be ψ-incomplete.
Identifying a model as ψ-incomplete does not specify
how such a failure is actually manifested. It might be
that Λ is parameterized by ψ and by supplementary vari-
ables, or it could alternatively be that the quantum state
does not parameterize the ontic states of the model at
all. In order to be able to distinguish these two possi-
ble manifestations of ψ-incompleteness, we introduce a
second dichotomic classification of ontological models.
Definition 4 An ontological model is ψ-ontic if for
any pair of preparation procedures, Pψ and Pφ, asso-
ciated with distinct quantum states ψ and φ, we have
p(λ|Pψ)p(λ|Pφ) = 0 for all λ.10
Hence, the epistemic states associated with distinct
quantum states are completely non-overlapping in a ψ-
ontic model. In other words, different quantum states
pick out disjoint regions of Λ. The idea of a ψ-incomplete
model that is also ψ-ontic is illustrated schematically in
part (b) of Fig. 2. Here, the ontic state space is parame-
terized by ψ (represented by a single axis) and a supple-
mentary hidden variable ω. The epistemic state p(λ|Pφ)
8 The Dirac delta function on Λ is defined by
R
Λ
δ(λ−λψ)f(λ)dλ =
f(λψ).
9 In the case of a mixture of pure states, one uses the associated
mixture of epistemic states. For instance, if the preparation is
of a pure state ψi with probability wi, then the epistemic state
is
P
i wip(λ|ψi). Note, however, that it is not at all clear how
to deal in a ψ-complete model with improper mixtures, that
is, mixed density operators that arise as the reduced density
operator of an entangled state. This fact is often used to criticize
such models.
10 Note that a better definition of the distinction requires thatR
Λ
dλ
p
p(λ|Pψ)
p
p(λ|Pφ) = 0. This definition demands the van-
ishing of the classical fidelity, rather than the product, of the
probability distributions associated with any pair of distinct pure
quantum states. This refinement is important for dealing with
ontological models wherein the only pairs of distributions that
overlap do so on a set of measure zero. Intuitively, one would not
want to classify these as ψ-epistemic, but only the fidelity-based
definition does justice to this intuition. This definition will not,
however, be needed here.
5representing a preparation procedure associated with φ
has the form of a Dirac delta function along the ψ axis,
which guarantees the disjointness property for epistemic
states associated with distinct quantum states. Even if
an ontological model is presented to us in a form where
it is not obvious whether ψ parameterizes Λ, by verify-
ing that the above definition is satisfied, one verifies that
such a parametrization can be found.
Another useful way of thinking about ψ-ontic models
is that the ontic state λ ‘encodes’ the quantum state ψ
because a given λ is only consistent with one choice of
ψ. Alternatively, we can see this encoding property as
follows. By Bayes’ theorem, one infers that any ψ-ontic
model satisfies p(Pψ |λ)p(Pφ|λ) = 0 for ψ 6= φ, which
implies that for every λ, there exists some ψ such that
p(Pψ |λ) = 1 and p(Pφ|λ) = 0 for all φ 6= ψ.
Definition 5 If an ontological model fails to be ψ-ontic,
then it is said to be ψ-epistemic.
It is worth spelling out what the failure of the ψ-
ontic property entails: there exists a pair of prepara-
tion procedures, Pψ and Pφ and a λ ∈ Λ such that
p (λ|Pψ) p (λ|Pφ) 6= 0, which is to say that the two epis-
temic states do overlap. Using Bayes’ theorem we can
equivalently formulate this requirement as ∃ Pψ , Pφ, λ :
p (Pψ|λ) p (Pφ|λ) 6= 0, which asserts that the ontic state
λ is consistent with both the quantum state ψ and the
quantum state φ. In a ψ-epistemic model, multiple dis-
tinct quantum states are consistent with the same state of
reality – the ontic state λ does not encode ψ. It is in this
sense that the quantum state is judged epistemic in such
models. This is illustrated schematically in part (c) of
Fig. 2, where the ontic state space Λ is one-dimensional,
and preparations associated with distinct ψ are associ-
ated with overlapping distributions on Λ.
Some comments are in order. The reader might well be
wondering why we do not admit that any ψ-incomplete
model is ‘epistemic’, simply because it associates a prob-
ability distribution of nontrivial width over Λ with each
quantum state. We admit that although it might be apt
to say that ψ-incomplete models have an epistemic char-
acter, the question of interest here is whether pure quan-
tum states have an epistemic character. It is for this
reason that we speak of whether a model is ‘ψ-epistemic’
rather than simply ‘epistemic’. By our definitions, ψ has
an ontic character if and only if a variation of ψ implies a
variation of reality and an epistemic character if and only
if a variation of ψ does not necessarily imply a variation
of reality.
For any model we can specify a ψ-complete versus ψ-
incomplete and ψ-ontic versus ψ-epistemic classification.
At first sight, this suggests that there will be four differ-
ent types of ontological model. This impression is mis-
taken however; there are only three different types of
model because one of the four combinations describes an
empty set. Specifically, if a model is ψ-complete, then it
is also ψ-ontic. This follows from the fact that if a model
is ψ-complete, then p (λ|Pψ) = δ (λ− λψ) , where λψ is
Complete state is λ
Complete state is ψ
ψ
ψ
λ
a) ψ-complete
c) ψ−epistemic
Complete state is λ=(ψ, ω)
b) ψ-supplemented
ψ
ω
FIG. 2: Schematic representation of how probability distribu-
tions associated with ψ are related in (a) ψ-complete mod-
els, (b) ψ-supplemented models and (c) ψ-epistemic models.
Note that the narrow gaussian shaped distributions in part
(b) denote an arbitrary distribution over the supplementary
variables ω combined with a dirac-delta function over the set
of quantum states, ψ.
the ontic state isomorphic to ψ, and from the fact that
δ (λ− λψ) δ (λ− λφ) = 0 for ψ 6= φ.
The contrapositive of this implication asserts that for
the quantum state to have an epistemic character, it can-
not be a complete description of reality. We have there-
fore proven:
Lemma 6 The following implications between properties
of ontological models hold11:
ψ-complete→ ψ-ontic,
and its negation,
ψ-epistemic→ ψ-incomplete. (2)
So it is impossible for a model to be both ψ-complete
and ψ-epistemic. Given Lemma 6, we can unambiguously
refer to models that are ψ-complete and ψ-ontic as simply
ψ-complete, and models that are ψ-incomplete and ψ-
epistemic as simply ψ-epistemic. The ψ-supplemented
models constitute the third category.
Definition 7 Ontological models that are ψ-incomplete
and ψ-ontic will be referred to as ψ-supplemented.
The classification of ontological models is summarized
in Fig. 2.
11 Implications such as C1 → C2 between two classes C1 and C2 of
ontological models should be read as ‘any model in class C1 is
necessarily also in class C2’.
6ψ-complete ψ-incomplete
ψ-ontic
ψ-epistemic
ψ-complete
ψ-epistemic
ψ-supplemented
FIG. 3: Two distinctions and the three classes of ontological
model that they define.
D. Examples
We now provide examples from the literature of models
that fall into each class.
1. The Beltrametti-Bugajski model
The model of Beltrametti and Bugajski [30] is essen-
tially a thorough rendering of what most would refer to
as an orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.12
The ontic state space postulated by the model is precisely
the projective Hilbert space, Λ = PH, so that a system
prepared in a quantum state ψ is associated with a sharp
probability distribution13 over Λ,
p (λ|ψ) = δ (λ− ψ) , (3)
where we are using ψ interchangeably to label the Hilbert
space vector and to denote the ray spanned by this vector
The model posits that the different possible states of
reality are simply the different possible quantum states.
It is therefore ψ-complete by Definition 2. It remains
only to demonstrate how it reproduces the quantum
statistics.
This is achieved by assuming that the probability of
obtaining an outcome k of a measurement procedure M
depends indeterministically on the system’s ontic state λ
as
p (k|M,λ) = tr (|λ〉〈λ|Ek) , (4)
where |λ〉 ∈ H denotes the quantum state associated with
λ ∈ PH, and where {Ek} is the POVM that quantum
12 Note, however, that there are several versions of orthodoxy
that differ in their manner of treating measurements. The
Beltrametti-Bugajski model is distinguished by the fact that it
fits within the framework for ontological models we have out-
lined.
13 Preparations which correspond to mixed quantum states can be
constructed as a convex sum of such sharp distributions
FIG. 4: Illustration of the epistemic states and indicator func-
tions in the Beltrametti-Bugajski model.
mechanics associates with M . It follows that,
Pr (k|M,ψ) =
∫
Λ
dλ p (k|M,λ) p(λ|ψ)
=
∫
Λ
dλ tr (|λ〉〈λ|Ek) δ (λ− λψ) (5)
= tr (|ψ〉〈ψ|Ek) , (6)
and so the quantum statistics are trivially reproduced.
If we restrict consideration to a system with a two di-
mensional Hilbert space then Λ is isomorphic to the Bloch
sphere, so that the ontic states are parameterized by the
Bloch vectors of unit length, which we denote by ~λ. The
Bloch vector associated with the Hilbert space ray ψ is
denoted ~ψ and is defined by |ψ〉 〈ψ| = 1
2
I + 1
2
~ψ · ~σ where
~σ = (σx, σy , σz) denotes the vector of Pauli matrices and
I denotes the identity operator.
If we furthermore consider M to be a projective
measurement, then it is associated with a projector-
valued measure {|φ〉 〈φ| ,
∣∣φ⊥〉 〈φ⊥∣∣} or equivalently, an
orthonormal basis {|φ〉 ,
∣∣φ⊥〉}. It is convenient to de-
note the probability of getting the φ outcome given ontic
state ~λ simply by p(φ|~λ). Eq. (4) simplifies to,
p(φ|~λ) = | 〈φ|λ〉 |2 (7)
=
1
2
(
1 + ~φ · ~λ
)
. (8)
The epistemic states and indicator functions for this
case of the Beltrametti-Bugajski model are illustrated
schematically in Fig. 4.
2. The Bell-Mermin model
We now present an ontological model for a two dimen-
sional Hilbert space that is originally due to Bell [31] and
was later adapted into a more intuitive form by Mermin
[32].
The model employs an ontic state space Λ that is a
Cartesian product of a pair of state spaces, Λ = Λ′×Λ′′.
7Each of Λ′ and Λ′′ is isomorphic to the unit sphere. It
follows that there are two variables required to specify the
systems total ontic state, ~λ′ ∈ Λ′ and ~λ′′ ∈ Λ′′. A system
prepared according to quantum state ψ is assumed to be
described by a product distribution on Λ′ × Λ′′,
p(~λ′, ~λ′′|ψ) = p(~λ′|ψ)p(~λ′′|ψ). (9)
The distribution over ~λ′ is a Dirac delta function centered
on ~ψ, that is, p(~λ′|ψ) = δ(~λ′ − ~ψ). The distribution over
~λ′′ ∈ Λ′′ is uniform over the unit sphere, p(~λ′′|ψ) = 1
4pi
,
independent of ψ. These epistemic states are illustrated
in Fig. 5. Consequently,
p(~λ′, ~λ′′|ψ) = 1
4π
δ(~λ′ − ~ψ). (10)
Suppose now that we wish to perform a projective mea-
surement associated with the basis {|φ〉 , ∣∣φ⊥〉}. The Bell-
Mermin model posits that the φ outcome will occur if and
only if the vector ~λ′ + ~λ′′ has a positive inner product
with the Bloch vector ~φ. This measurement is therefore
associated with the indicator function,
p(φ|~λ′, ~λ′′) = Θ(~φ · (~λ′ + ~λ′′)), (11)
where Θ is the Heaviside step function defined by
Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0
= 0 if x ≤ 0.
The Bell-Mermin model’s predictions for p(φ|ψ) (cal-
culated as the overlap of the epistemic distributions from
Fig. 5 with the indicator function defined in (11)) suc-
cessfully reproduce the quantum mechanical Born rule,
p(φ|ψ) = 1
4π
∫∫
dΛ′dΛ′′ δ(~λ′ − ~λ′ψ) Θ(~λ′φ · (~λ′ + ~λ′′))
=
1
2
(
1 + ~λ′φ · ~λ′ψ
)
= |〈ψ|φ〉|2 . (12)
We can see immediately that the Bell-Mermin model is
ψ-incomplete because Λ = Λ′ × Λ′′ 6= PH. Furthermore,
p(λ|ψ)p(λ|φ) = p(~λ′, ~λ′′|ψ)p(~λ′, ~λ′′|φ)
=
1
16π2
δ(~λ′ − ~ψ)δ(~λ′ − ~φ)
= 0 if ψ 6= φ, (13)
implying that the Bell-Mermin model is ψ-ontic. Recall-
ing Definition 7 we conclude that this model falls into the
class ψ-supplemented.
Because the ontic state space of this model is four di-
mensional, it is difficult to illustrate it in a figure. We
can present the distributions over ~λ′ and ~λ′′ on separate
unit spheres, as in Fig. 5 , but the indicator functions
cannot be presented in this way.
FIG. 5: Illustration of the epistemic states in the Bell-Mermin
model.
3. The Kochen-Specker model
As our final example, we consider a model for a two-
dimensional Hilbert space due to Kochen and Specker [2].
The ontic state space Λ is taken to be the unit sphere,
and a quantum state ψ is associated with the probability
distribution,
p(λ|ψ) = 1
π
Θ(~ψ · ~λ) ~ψ · ~λ, (14)
where ~ψ is the Bloch vector corresponding to the quan-
tum state ψ. It assigns the value cos θ to all points an
angle θ < pi
2
from ψ, and the value zero to points with
θ > pi
2
. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.
Upon implementing a measurement procedure M as-
sociated with a projector |φ〉〈φ| a positive outcome will
occur if the ontic state ~λ of the system lies in the hemi-
sphere centered on ~φ, i.e.,
p(φ|λ) = Θ(~φ · ~λ). (15)
It can be checked that the overlaps of p(λ|ψ) and p(φ|λ)
then reproduce the required quantum statistics,
p(φ|ψ) =
∫
dλ
1
π
Θ(~ψ · ~λ)Θ(~φ · ~λ) ~ψ · ~λ
=
1
2
(1 + ~ψ · ~φ)
= |〈ψ|φ〉|2 . (16)
Referring to Definition 3 we see that this model is ψ-
incomplete, since although Λ is isomorphic to the sys-
tem’s projective Hilbert space, Eq. (14) implies that the
model associates non-sharp distributions with quantum
states. Furthermore,
p(λ|ψ)p(λ|φ) = 1
π2
Θ(~ψ · ~λ) Θ(~φ · ~λ) ~ψ · ~λ ~φ · ~λ,
is nonzero for nonorthogonal φ and ψ, showing, via Def-
inition 5, that the Kochen-Specker model is ψ-epistemic.
8FIG. 6: Illustration of the epistemic states and indicator func-
tions of the Kochen-Specker model.
4. Connections between the models
It is not too difficult to see that the Bell-Mermin model
is simply the Beltrametti-Bugajski model supplemented
by a hidden variable that uniquely determines the out-
comes of all projective measurements. We need only
note that within the Bell-Mermin model, the probability
of obtaining the measurement outcome φ given ~λ′ (i.e.
not conditioning on the supplementary hidden variable
~λ′′) is,
p(φ|~λ′) =
∫
Λ
d~λ′′p(φ|~λ′, ~λ′′)p(~λ′′)
=
∫
Λ
d~λ′′Θ(~φ · (~λ′ + ~λ′′)) 1
4π
=
1
2
(
1 + ~φ · ~λ′
)
,
which is precisely the indicator function of the
Beltrametti-Bugajski model, Eq. (8). So, whereas in the
Beltrametti-Bugajski model, outcomes that are not de-
termined uniquely by ~λ′ (i.e. for which 0 < p(φ|~λ′) < 1)
are deemed to be objectively indeterministic, in the Bell-
Mermin model this indeterminism is presumed to be
merely epistemic, resulting from ignorance of the value
of the supplementary hidden variable ~λ′′. Note that al-
though the Bell-Mermin model eliminates the objective
indeterminism of the Beltrametti-Bugajski model, it pays
a price in ontological economy – the dimensionality of the
ontic state space is doubled.
Furthermore, there is a strong connection, previously
unnoticed, between the Bell-Mermin model and the
Kochen-Specker model. Although the ontic state is spec-
ified by two variables, ~λ′ and ~λ′′, in the Bell-Mermin
model, the indicator functions for projective measure-
ments, presented in Eq. (11), depend only on ~λ′ + ~λ′′. It
follows that if one re-parameterizes the ontic state space
by the pair of vectors ~u = ~λ′ + ~λ′′ and ~v = ~λ′ − ~λ′′,
then the indicator functions depend only on ~u. Conse-
quently, the only aspect of the epistemic state that is
significant for calculating operational predictions is the
marginal p(~u|ψ). This is calculated to be,
p(~u|ψ) =
∫
d~v p(~u,~v|ψ) (17)
=
∫
d~v
1
4π
δ(
1
2
~u+
1
2
~v − ~ψ)
=
2
π
Θ(~ψ · ~u) ~ψ · ~u.
But, on normalizing the vector ~u to lie on the unit sphere,
this is precisely the form of the epistemic state posited by
the Kochen-Specker model, Eq. (14), with ~u substituted
for ~λ.
It follows that the Kochen-Specker model is simply the
Bell-Mermin model with the variable ~v eliminated, so
that the variable ~u completely specifies the ontic state.
(Reducing the ontic state space in this way leaves the
empirical predictions of the model intact because these
did not depend on ~v.)
A methodological principle that is often adopted in
the construction of physical theories is that one should
not posit unnecessary ontological structure. Appealing
to Occam’s razor in the present context would lead one
naturally to judge the variable ~v to be un-physical, akin
to a gauge degree of freedom, and to thereby favor the
minimalist ontological structure posited by the Kochen-
Specker model over that of the Bell-Mermin model.
We see, therefore, that the price in ontological over-
head that was paid by the Bell-Mermin model to elim-
inate objective indeterminism from the Beltrametti-
Bugajski model did not need to be paid. The Kochen-
Specker model renders the indeterminism epistemic with-
out any increase in the size of the ontic state space.
It is interesting to note that starting from the orthodox
model of Beltrametti and Bugajski for two dimensional
Hilbert spaces, if one successively enforces (1) a principle
that any indeterminism must be epistemic rather than
objective, and (2) a principle that any gauge-like degrees
of freedom must be eliminated as un-physical, one arrives
at the ψ-epistemic model of Kochen and Specker. One
is led to wonder whether such a procedure might be ap-
plied to ontological models of quantum theory in higher
dimensional Hilbert spaces.
This concludes our discussion of the classification
scheme for ontological models. We now turn our atten-
tion to the question of how these classes fare on the issue
of locality.
III. LOCALITY IN ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
A necessary component of any sensible notion of local-
ity is separability, which we define as follows.
Definition 8 Suppose a region R can be divided into lo-
cal regions R1, R2, ..., Rn. An ontological model is said
to be separable (denoted S) only if the ontic state space
9FIG. 7: Space-time regions used in the definition of local
causality proposed by Bell [33].
ΛR of region R is the Cartesian product of the ontic state
spaces ΛRi of the regions Ri,
ΛR = ΛR1 × ΛR1 × · · · × ΛRn .
The assumption of separability is made, for instance, by
Bell when he restricts his attention to theories of local
beables. These are variables parameterizing the ontic
state space “which (unlike for example the total energy)
can be assigned to some bounded space-time region” [34].
Separability is generally not considered to be a suffi-
cient condition for locality. An additional notion of lo-
cality, famously made precise by Bell [33, 35], appeals
to the causal structure of relativistic theories. The def-
inition appeals to the space-time regions defined in Fig.
7. Regions A and B are presumed to be space-like sepa-
rated.
Definition 9 A separable ontological model is locally
causal (LC) if and only if the probabilities of events
in space-time region B are unaltered by specification of
events in space-time region A, when one is already given
a complete specification of the events in a space-time re-
gion C that screens off B from the intersection of the
backward light cones of A and B.
Local causality can be expressed as
p(B|A, λC) = p(B|λC), (18)
where B is a proposition about events occurring in region
B, λC is the ontic state of space-time region C (recalling
that the ontic state of a system is a complete specification
of the properties of that system), and A is a proposition
about events in region A.
Finally, we define locality to be the conjunction of these
two notions.
Definition 10 An ontological model is local (L) if and
only if it is separable and locally causal.
Given that the Hilbert space associated with a pair of
distinct regions of space (or a pair of systems confined
to distinct regions) is the tensor product of the Hilbert
spaces associated with each region (or system), rather
than the Cartesian product, we deduce directly from Def-
initions 2 and 8 that ψ-complete models are not separa-
ble, and consequently not local,14
ψ-complete =⇒ ¬S =⇒ ¬L. (19)
So, one needn’t even test whether ψ-complete models
are locally causal, given that they fail to even exhibit
separability, which is a prerequisite to making sense of
the notion of local causality.
There is in fact good evidence that this kind of
reasoning captures Einstein’s earliest misgivings about
quantum theory. Already in 1926, Einstein judges
Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics to be “altogether too prim-
itive” [36]. Howard has argued convincingly that the sig-
nificant issue for Einstein, even in those early days, was
separability [37]. For instance, in order to describe multi-
particle systems, Schro¨dinger had replaced de Broglie’s
waves in 3-space with waves in configuration space,
and had abandoned the notion of particle trajectories
(thereby endorsing a ψ-complete view). But Einstein was
dubious of this move: “The field in a many-dimensional
coordinate space does not smell like something real”[38],
and “If only the undulatory fields introduced there could
be transplanted from the n-dimensional coordinate space
to the 3 or 4 dimensional!”[39].
Nonetheless, even if one ignores the non-separability of
entangled quantum states, it is straightforward to show
that the manner in which such states are updated after
local measurements implies a failure of local causality if
one adopts a ψ-complete model. Einstein first made this
argument later in 1927, as we shall see in Sec. IVB.
A. ψ-ontic models of quantum theory are nonlocal
We now demonstrate that there exists a very simple
argument establishing that all ψ-ontic models (not just
those that are ψ-complete) must violate locality. The
argument constitutes a “nonlocality theorem” that is
stronger than Einstein’s 1927 argument but weaker than
Bell’s theorem. In the next section, we shall argue that it
is in fact the content of Einstein’s 1935 argument for in-
completeness (the argument appearing in his correspon-
dence with Schro¨dinger, not the EPR paper) and we shall
explore what light is thereby shed on his interpretational
stance. For now, however, we shall simply present the
argument in the clearest possible fashion.
Consider two separated parties, Alice and Bob, who
each hold one member of a pair of two-level quan-
14 Some might argue that the ontic state space of a system should
include the mixed quantum states. However, even if the ontic
state space of a system were taken to be the convex hull of the
projective Hilbert space for that system, the condition of separa-
bility would still not be satisfied because the Cartesian product
of the ontic state spaces of two systems would not contain any
correlated quantum states.
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tum systems prepared in the maximally entangled state
|ψ+〉 = (|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉) /√2. If Alice chooses to im-
plement a measurement M01 associated with the basis
{|0〉 , |1〉}, then depending on whether she obtains out-
come 0 or 1, she updates the quantum state of Bob’s
system to |0〉 or |1〉 respectively (these occur with equal
probability). On the other hand, if she implements a
measurement M± associated with the basis {|+〉, |−〉} ,
where |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2, then she updates the quan-
tum state of Bob’s system to |+〉 or |−〉 depending on
her outcome. Although Alice cannot control which in-
dividual pure quantum state will describe Bob’s system,
she can choose which of two disjoint sets, {|0〉 , |1〉} or
{|+〉 , |−〉}, it will belong to. Schro¨dinger described this
effect as ‘steering’ Bob’s state [40].
This steering phenomenon allows us to prove the fol-
lowing theorem15.
Theorem 11 Any ψ-ontic ontological model that repro-
duces the quantum statistics (QSTAT) violates locality,16
ψ-ontic ∧QSTAT→ ¬L.
Proof. The measurements that Alice performs can be
understood as ‘remote preparations’ of Bob’s system (re-
call from Sec. II A that a preparation is simply a list of
experimental instructions and therefore need not involve
a direct interaction with the system being prepared). De-
note by P0 and P1 the remote preparations correspond-
ing to Alice measuring M01 and obtaining the 0 and 1
outcomes respectively (these preparations are associated
with the states |0〉 and |1〉 of Bob’s system). Let P+
and P− be defined similarly. Finally, denote by P01 the
remote preparation that results from a measurement of
M01 but wherein one does not condition on the outcome,
and similarly for P±. Given these definitions, we can
infer that,
p(λ|P01) = 1
2
p(λ|P0) + 1
2
p(λ|P1) , (20)
p(λ|P±) = 1
2
p(λ|P+) + 1
2
p(λ|P−) , (21)
where λ is the ontic state of Bob’s system, which is
well-defined by virtue of the assumption of separability.
15 Note that one might suppose that the conclusion of Theorem
11 can be arrived at more simply by the line of reasoning, ψ-
ontic→ ¬S → ¬L. However, it is not clear whether the ability
to supplement a ψ-ontic model with ‘hidden variables’ allows one
to alleviate a violation of separability within ψ-ontic models.
16 Note that no notion of ‘realism’ appears in our implication. This
is because there is no sense in which there is an assumption of
realism that could be abandoned while salvaging locality. There
is a notion of realism at play when we grant that experimental
procedures prepare and measure properties of systems, but it is
a prerequisite to making sense of the notion of locality. Norsen
has emphasized this point [41, 42].
Eqs. (20) and (21) are justified by noting that the proba-
bility one assigns to λ in the unconditioned case is simply
the weighted sum of the probability one assigns in each
of the conditioned cases, where the weights are the prob-
abilities for each condition to hold [1].
The proof is by contradiction. The assumption of local
causality implies that the probabilities for Bob’s system
being in various ontic states are independent of the mea-
surement that Alice performs. Consequently,17
p(λ|P01) = p(λ|P±). (22)
Multiplying together Eqs. (20) and (21) and making use
of Eq. (22), we obtain,
4 p (λ|P01)2 = p (λ|P+) p (λ|P0) + p (λ|P+) p (λ|P1)
+ p (λ|P−) p (λ|P0) + p (λ|P−) p (λ|P1) .
(23)
Therefore, for any λ within the support of p (λ|P01) (a
non-empty set), we must have,
p (λ|P+) p (λ|P0) + p (λ|P+) p (λ|P1)
+ p (λ|P−) p (λ|P0) + p (λ|P−) p (λ|P1) > 0, (24)
which requires that at least one of the following inequal-
ities be satisfied,
p (λ|P+) p (λ|P0) > 0,
p (λ|P+) p (λ|P1) > 0,
p (λ|P−) p (λ|P0) > 0,
p (λ|P−) p (λ|P1) > 0. (25)
It follows that there exists at least one pair of distinct
quantum states (either |+〉 , |0〉 or |+〉 , |1〉 or |−〉 , |0〉 or
|−〉 , |1〉) such that the epistemic states associated with
them are overlapping on the ontic state space. By Defini-
tion 5, we infer that the ontological model must therefore
be ψ-epistemic.
IV. REASSESSING EINSTEIN’S ARGUMENTS
FOR INCOMPLETENESS
A. The EPR incompleteness argument
It is well known that Einstein disputed the claim that
the quantum state represented a complete description of
reality on the grounds that such a view implied a failure
17 Note that an assumption of no superluminal signalling is not
sufficient to obtain Eq. (22) because p(λ|P01) and p(λ|P±) could
change non-locally, but in such a way that every indicator func-
tion on system B that corresponds to a possible measurement is
unable to distinguish p(λ|P01) from p(λ|P±) despite their differ-
ences.
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of locality. Einstein’s views on the matter are often as-
sumed to be well represented by the contents of the EPR
paper [43]. There is, however, strong evidence suggest-
ing that this is far from the truth. Einstein describes his
part in the paper in a letter to Schro¨dinger dated June
19, 1935 [44]:
“For reasons of language this [paper] was
written by Podolsky after many discussions.
But still it has not come out as well as I really
wanted; on the contrary, the main point was,
so to speak, buried by the erudition.”
Fine describes well the implications of these comments:
[12].
“I think we should take in the message of
these few words: Einstein did not write the
paper, Podolsky did, and somehow the cen-
tral point was obscured. No doubt Podolsky
(of Russian origin) would have found it nat-
ural to leave the definite article out of the ti-
tle [Can quantum mechanical description be
considered complete?]. Moreover the logically
opaque structure of the piece is uncharacter-
istic of Einstein’s thought and writing. There
are no earlier drafts of this article among Ein-
stein’s papers and no correspondence or other
evidence that I have been able to find which
would settle the question as to whether Ein-
stein saw a draft of the paper before it was
published. Podolsky left Princeton for Cali-
fornia at about the time of submission and it
could well be that, authorized by Einstein, he
actually composed it on his own.”
A more accurate picture of Einstein’s views is achieved
by looking to his own publications and his correspon-
dence. Although it is not widely known, Einstein pre-
sented a simple argument for incompleteness at the 1927
Solvay conference. Also, in the letter to Schro¨dinger that
we quote above, Einstein gives his own argument for in-
completeness, which makes use of a similar gedankenex-
periment to the one described in the EPR paper, but has
a significantly different logical structure.
Before turning to the details of these two arguments,
we summarize the time-line of their presentation relative
to EPR,
• October 1927: Einstein presents an incomplete-
ness argument at the Solvay conference [9].
• May 1935: The EPR argument for incompleteness
is published [43].
• June 1935: Einstein presents an incompleteness
argument, differing substantially from the EPR ar-
gument, in his correspondence with Schro¨dinger
[44]. (This first appears in print in March 1936
[45].) We will refer to this as Einstein’s 1935 ar-
gument, not to be confused with the conceptually
distinct EPR argument from the same year.
A B
FIG. 8: Einstein’s 1927 Gedankenexperiment, in which a sin-
gle particle wavefunction (blue) diffracts at a small open-
ing (bottom) before impinging upon a hemispherical detector
(top). According to quantum mechanics, the probability of
a double detection at two distinct regions A and B of the
detector is zero.
B. Einstein’s 1927 incompleteness argument
Einstein’s first public argument for the incompleteness
of quantum mechanics was presented during the general
discussion at the 1927 Solvay conference [9]. Einstein
considered a gedankenexperiment in which electron wave-
functions are diffracted through a small opening, so that
they then impinge upon a hemispherical screen, as illus-
trated in Fig. 8. He noted that [46],
“The scattered wave moving towards [the
screen] does not show any preferred direction.
If |ψ|2 were simply regarded as the probabil-
ity that at a certain point a given particle is
found at a given time, it could happen that
the same elementary process produces an ac-
tion in two or several places of the screen.
But the interpretation, according to which
|ψ|2 expresses the probability that this parti-
cle is found at a given point, assumes an en-
tirely peculiar mechanism of action at a dis-
tance which prevents the wave continuously
distributed in space from producing an action
in two places on the screen.”
Norsen has presented the essence of this argument in
an elegant form18 that we reproduce here [18]. Consider
two points A and B on the screen and denote by 1A
and 0A respectively the cases where there is or isn’t an
electron detected at A (and similarly for B). We take the
initial quantum state of the electron to be of the form,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉), (26)
18 The form of the argument is chosen to parallel the form of Bell’s
argument in order to make evident the hypocrisy of a widespread
tendency among commentators to praise Bell’s reasoning while
rejecting Einstein’s.
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where |A(B)〉 is the quantum state that leads to an elec-
tron detection at A(B). Now suppose that one consid-
ers an ontological model of the scenario, employing ontic
states λ ∈ Λ. Then the probability of obtaining a si-
multaneous detection at both sites A and B is given by
p(1A∧1B|λ) = p(1A|λ)p(1B |1A, λ). Suppose furthermore
that the model describing these events is assumed to be
local, then we can write p(1B|1A, λ) = p(1B|λ) and thus
p(1A ∧ 1B|λ) = p(1A|λ)p(1B |λ). If the model is taken to
satisfy ψ-completeness then λ = ψ, and we infer that,
p(1A ∧ 1B|ψ) = p(1A|ψ)p(1B|ψ). (27)
Inserting the quantum mechanical predictions p(1A|ψ) =
p(1B|ψ) = 12 , we obtain p(1A ∧ 1B|ψ) = 14 , which entails
a nonzero probability for simultaneous detections at both
A and B, in stark contradiction with what is predicted
by quantum mechanics.
Hence the logical structure of this rendition of Ein-
stein’s 1927 argument is that L∧QSTAT∧ψ-complete→
contradiction, i.e., that,
L ∧QSTAT→ ψ-incomplete. (28)
Note that, unlike the 1935 argument to which we shall
turn in the next section, the 1927 argument cannot be
used to show locality to be at odds with more general ψ-
ontic models because if ψ is supplemented with a hidden
variable ω, then the complete description of the system
is λ = (ψ, ω), and Eq. (27) is replaced by,
p(1A ∧ 1B|ψ, ω) = p(1A|ψ, ω)p(1B|ψ, ω). (29)
Because there is no reason to assume that p(1A|ψ, ω) =
p(1A|ψ) nor that p(1B|ψ, ω) = p(1B|ψ) (conditioning on
the hidden variable will in general change the probability
of detection), one can no longer infer a nonzero proba-
bility for simultaneous detections at both A and B, and
the contradiction is blocked.
C. Einstein’s 1935 incompleteness argument
In his 1935 correspondence with Schro¨dinger, after not-
ing that the EPR paper did not do justice to his views,
Einstein presents a different version of the argument for
incompleteness. The argument differs markedly from
that of the EPR paper from the very outset by adopting
a different notion of completeness [44],
“[...] one would like to say the following: ψ
is correlated one-to-one with the real state of
the real system. [...] If this works, then I
speak of a complete description of reality by
the theory. But if such an interpretation is
not feasible, I call the theoretical description
‘incomplete’.”
It is quite clear that by ‘real state of the real sys-
tem’, Einstein is referring to the ontic state pertaining
to a system. Bearing this in mind, his definition of
completeness can be identified as precisely our notion
of ψ-completeness given in Definition 2. Einstein then
re-iterates to Schro¨dinger the beginning of the EPR ar-
gument, starting by considering a joint system (AB) to
be prepared in an entangled state by some ‘collision’ be-
tween the subsystems A and B. He then emphasizes
(what we would now call) the ‘steering phenomenon’ by
noting how a choice of measurement on A can result in
the subsystem B being described by one of two quantum
states ψB or ψB.
Einstein then uses this scenario to derive his preferred
proof of incompleteness,
“Now what is essential is exclusively that ψB
and ψB are in general different from one an-
other. I assert that this difference is incom-
patible with the hypothesis that the descrip-
tion is correlated one-to-one with the phys-
ical reality (the real state). After the colli-
sion, the real state of (AB) consists precisely
of the real state of A and the real state of
B, which two states have nothing to do with
one another. The real state of B thus can-
not depend upon the kind of measurement I
carry out on A. (’Separation hypothesis’ from
above.) But then for the same state of B there
are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally
justified ψB, which contradicts the hypothe-
sis of a one-to-one or complete description of
the real states.”
Einstein is clearly presuming separability with his as-
sertion that “the real state of (AB) consists precisely of
the real state of A and the real state of B”. He further-
more appeals to local causality when he asserts that “The
real state of B thus cannot depend upon the kind of mea-
surement I carry out on A”, because he is ruling out the
possibility of events at A having causes in the space-like
separated region B.
Now, although Einstein’s conclusion is nominally to
deny ψ-completeness, he does so by showing that there
can be many quantum states associated with the same
ontic state, “for the same state of B there are two (in gen-
eral arbitrarily many) equally justified ψB”. The proof
need not have taken this form. An alternative approach
would have been to try to deny ψ-completeness by show-
ing that there are many ontic states associated with the
same quantum state. For our purposes, this distinction
is critical because what Einstein has shown through his
argument is that a variation in ψ need not correspond
to a variation in the ontic state. Recalling Definition
4, we see that Einstein has established the failure of ψ-
onticness! His 1935 incompleteness argument rules out
ψ-onticness en route to ruling out ψ-completeness.
The structure of his argument, in our terminology, is:
L ∧QSTAT→ ¬(ψ-ontic)→ ψ-incomplete. (30)
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But the second implication is actually a weakening of
the conclusion, because among the ψ-incomplete mod-
els are some which are ψ-ontic (those we have called ψ-
supplemented) and the argument is strong enough to rule
these out.
Einstein would have done better, therefore, to charac-
terize his argument as,
L ∧QSTAT→ ¬(ψ-ontic),
which is our Theorem 11.
V. HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS
A. A puzzle
What can we gain from this retrospective assessment of
Einstein’s incompleteness arguments? There is one long-
standing puzzle that it helps to solve: why did Einstein
ever switch from the simple 1927 argument, which in-
volves only a single measurement, to the 1935 argument,
which involves two?
The move he made in 1935 to the two measurement
argument described in Sec. IVC proved to be a perma-
nent one. He published the argument for the first time
in 1936 [45] and from this point onwards, the 1935 ar-
gument proved the mainstay of his assault on orthodox
quantum theory, appearing in various writings [47, 48],
most notably his own autobiographical notes [49]. In
fact, there is evidence to suggest that this argument was
still on Einstein’s mind as late as 1954 [50].
Many commentators have noted that an EPR-style
argument for incompleteness can be made even if one
imagines that only a single measurement is performed
[14, 15, 16, 17]. The resulting argument is similar to
Einstein’s 1927 argument, although it differs insofar as it
appeals to a pair of systems rather than a single parti-
cle and makes use of the EPR criterion for reality rather
than the assumption of ψ-completeness. Nonetheless, the
point being made by these authors is the same as the one
we have just noted: having multiple possible choices of
measurement is not required to reach the conclusion of
incompleteness from the assumption of locality. Further-
more, the extra complication actually detracts from the
argument (whether it follows the reasoning of the EPR
paper or Einstein’s correspondence with Schro¨dinger),
because it introduces counterfactuals and modal logic
into the game, and this is precisely where most critics, in-
cluding Bohr [51], have focussed their attention. The sin-
gle measurement versions of the argument are, of course,
completely immune to such criticisms.
One explanation that has been offered for Einstein’s
move to two measurements is that one can thereby land
a harder blow on the proponent of the orthodox approach
by also defeating the uncertainty principle in the course
of the argument. Maudlin refers to this “extra twist of
the knife” as “an unnecessary bit of grandstanding (prob-
ably due to Podolsky)”[17]. Although this may be an
accurate assessment of what is going on in the EPR pa-
per, it does not explain Einstein’s post-1935 conversion
to the two-measurement form of the argument. Indeed,
Einstein explicitly de-emphasizes the uncertainty princi-
ple in his own writings. For instance, in his 1935 letter to
Schro¨dinger, he remarks: “I couldn’t care less19 whether
ψB and ψB can be understood as eigenfunctions of ob-
servables B, B”.[44]
Another explanation worth considering concerns the
experimental significance of the two gedankenexperi-
ments. Although Einstein’s incompleteness arguments
imply a dilemma between ψ-completeness and locality, a
sceptic who conceded the validity of the argument could
still evade the dilemma by choosing to reject some part
of quantum mechanics, specifically, those aspects that
were required to reach Einstein’s conclusion. To elimi-
nate this possibility, one would have to provide exper-
imental evidence in favor of these aspects. From this
perspective, there is a significant difference between the
1927 and 1935 gedankenexperiments. In the case of
the former, the measurement statistics to which Ein-
stein appeals (perfect anti-correlation of measurements
of local particle number) can also be obtained from the
mixed state 1
2
(|A〉〈A|+|B〉〈B|) rather than the pure state
(1/
√
2)(|A〉+ |B〉). It follows that the sceptic could avoid
the dilemma by positing that such coherence was illusory.
To convince the sceptic, further experimental data – for
instance, a demonstration of coherence via interference –
would be required. On the other hand, the measurement
statistics of the 1935 gedankenexperiment cannot, in gen-
eral, be explained under the sceptic’s hypothesis (which
in this case amounts to positing a separable mixed state).
Indeed, any hypothesis that takes system B to be in a
mixture of pure quantum states (that are unaffected by
events at A) can be ruled out by the 1935 set-up be-
cause the latter allows one to make predictions about
the outcomes of incompatible measurements on B that
are in violation of the uncertainty principle. This has
been demonstrated by Reid in the context of the EPR
scenario [52] and by Wiseman et al.[53] more generally.
Although Wiseman has argued that this provides a rea-
son for favoring the 1935 over the 1927 version of Ein-
stein’s incompleteness argument [54], he does not suggest
that it was Einstein’s reason. Indeed, this is unlikely to
have been the case. Certainly, we are not aware of any-
thing in Einstein’s writings that would suggest so.20
19 “ist mir wurst” (emphasis in original).
20 Although Schro¨dinger had some doubts about the validity of
quantum theory, these concerned whether experiments would
confirm the existence of the steering phenomenon (“I am not
satisfied about there being enough experimental evidence for
that.”[55]). This sentiment was a reaction to the 1935 form of
Einstein’s argument and so could not have motivated it. It is
unlikely that anyone would have been sceptical of the spatial
coherence assumed in Einstein’s 1927 argument.
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B. A possible explanation
Our analysis of Einstein’s incompleteness arguments
suggests a very different explanation. In Sec. IVC,
we demonstrated that the 1935 argument is able to
prove that both ψ-complete and ψ-supplemented mod-
els are incompatible with a locality assumption, leaving
ψ-epistemic models as the only approach holding any
hope of preserving locality. In contrast, the 1927 ar-
gument cannot achieve this stronger conclusion, as was
noted in Sec. IVB. (This also follows from the fact that
the deBroglie-Bohm theory constitutes a ψ-supplemented
model which provides a local explanation of the 1927
thought experiment.) One can therefore understand Ein-
stein’s otherwise baffling abandonment of his 1927 incom-
pleteness argument in favor of the more complicated 1935
one by supposing that he sought to advocate a particu-
lar kind of ontological model, namely, a ψ-epistemic one.
This interpretation of events is bolstered by the fact that
Einstein often followed his discussions of the incomplete-
ness argument with an endorsement of the epistemic view
of quantum states. We turn to the evidence of his papers
and correspondence.
In addition to his conviction that “[...] the descrip-
tion afforded by quantum-mechanics is to be viewed [...]
as an incomplete and indirect description of reality, that
will again be replaced later by a complete and direct de-
scription.” [47], Einstein specifically advocated that
“[t]he ψ-function is to be understood as the
description not of a single system but of an
ensemble of systems.” [56],
and that the meaning of the quantum state was “simi-
lar to that of the density function in classical statistical
mechanics.”[57]
It is not immediately obvious that this is equivalent
to an epistemic interpretation of the quantum state. We
argue for this equivalence on the grounds that the ensem-
bles Einstein mentions are simply a manner of ground-
ing talk about the probabilities that characterize an ob-
server’s knowledge. In other words, the only difference
between “ensemble talk” and “epistemic talk” is that in
the former, probabilities are understood as relative fre-
quencies in an ensemble of systems, while in the latter,
they are understood as characterizations of the incom-
plete knowledge that an observer has of a single system
when she knows the ensemble from which it was drawn.
Ultimately, then, the only difference we can discern be-
tween the ensemble view and the epistemic view concerns
how one speaks about probabilities, and although one can
debate the merits of different conceptions of probability,
we do not feel that the distinction is significant in this
context, nor is there any indication of Einstein having
thought so.
Indeed, in a 1937 letter to Ernst Cassirer, Einstein
seems to use the two manners of characterizing his view
interchangeably as he spells out what conclusion should
be drawn from his 1935 incompleteness argument [58],
“[...] this entire difficulty disappears if one
relates ψ2 not to an individual system but,
in Born’s sense, to a certain state-ensemble
of material points 2. Then, however, it is
clear that ψ2 does not describe the totality
of what “really” pertains to the partial sys-
tem 2, rather only what we know about it in
this particular case.”
Einstein’s endorsement of an epistemic understanding
of the quantum state is also explicit elsewhere in his per-
sonal correspondence (of which relevant extracts have
been conveniently collected together in essays by Fine
and Howard [11, 37, 59]). For instance, in a 1945 letter
to Epstein, after providing an incompleteness argument
containing all the features of the one used in 1935, Ein-
stein concludes that [60],
“Naturally one cannot do justice to [the ar-
gument] by means of a wave function. Thus I
incline to the opinion that the wave function
does not (completely) describe what is real,
but only a to us empirically accessible max-
imal knowledge regarding that which really
exists [...] This is what I mean when I ad-
vance the view that quantum mechanics gives
an incomplete description of the real state of
affairs.”
Perhaps the most explicit example occurs in a 1948
reply to Heitler, criticizing Heitler’s notion that the ob-
server plays an important role in the process of wave-
function collapse, and advocating [61],
“that one conceives of the psi-function only
as an incomplete description of a real state of
affairs, where the incompleteness of the de-
scription is forced by the fact that observation
of the state is only able to grasp part of the
real factual situation. Then one can at least
escape the singular conception that observa-
tion (conceived as an act of consciousness) in-
fluences the real physical state of things; the
change in the psi-function through observa-
tion then does not correspond essentially to
the change in a real matter of fact but rather
to the alteration in our knowledge of this mat-
ter of fact.”(emphasis in original)
The result, implicit in Einstein’s 1935 argument, that
the only realistic interpretation of quantum states that
could possibly be local are ψ-epistemic, is of course su-
perseded by Bell’s theorem [20]. The latter famously
demonstrates that any theory providing an adequate de-
scription of nature must violate locality (as emphasized
in Refs. [41, 62]). We do not dispute this. The point
we wish to make is simply that the ‘big guns’ of Bell’s
theorem are only needed to deal with ψ-epistemic mod-
els. Any ψ-ontic model can be seen to be non-local by
an argument that appeared in print as far back as 1936.
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Therefore, in the 28 years between the publication
of Einstein’s 1935 incompleteness argument (in 1936)
and the publication of Bell’s theorem (in 1964), only ψ-
epistemic ontological models were actually viable to those
who were daring enough to defy convention and seek an
interpretation that preserves locality. Why is it then that
during the pre-Bell era, there was not a greater recogni-
tion among such researchers of the apparent promise of
ψ-epistemic approaches vis-a-vis locality?
It seems likely to us that the distinction between ψ-
supplemented and ψ-epistemic hidden variable models
was simply not sufficiently clear. One searches in vain
for any semblance of a distinction in Einstein’s descrip-
tion of the alternative to the orthodox ψ-complete view
during the general discussion at the 1927 Solvay confer-
ence. But nothing in what we have said would lead one
to expect that Einstein had clearly understood the dis-
tinction as early as 1927. What is surprising is that,
after 1935, Einstein seems to voice his support for an
epistemic view of ψ in his papers and correspondence,
and yet never bothers to articulate, nor explicitly de-
nounce, the other way in which his bijective notion of
completeness (ψ-completeness) could fail, namely, by ψ
being ontic but supplemented with additional variables.
By characterizing his 1935 argument as one that
merely established the incompleteness of quantum the-
ory on the assumption of locality, Einstein did it a great
disservice. For in isolation, a call for the completion of
quantum theory would naturally have led many to pursue
hidden variable theories that interpreted the fundamen-
tal mathematical object of the theory, the wave function,
in the same manner in which the fundamental object of
other physical theories were customarily treated – as on-
tic. But such a strategy was known by Einstein to be
unable to preserve locality. Thus it is likely that the
force of Einstein’s 1935 argument from locality to the
epistemic interpretation of ψ was not felt simply because
the argument was not sufficiently well articulated.
A proper assessment of the plausibility of these histor-
ical possibilities would require a careful reexamination of
Einstein’s papers and correspondence with the distinc-
tion between ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic ontological mod-
els in mind. We hope that such a reassessment might
yield further insight into the history of incompleteness
and nonlocality arguments.
VI. THE FUTURE OF ψ-EPISTEMIC MODELS
Bell’s theorem shows that the preservation of local-
ity is not a motivation for a ψ-epistemic ontological
model, because it cannot be maintained. However, it
does not provide any reason for preferring a ψ-ontic ap-
proach over one that is ψ-epistemic; it is neutral on
this front. Moreover, there are many new motivations
(unrelated to locality) that can now be provided in fa-
vor of ψ-epistemic models. For instance, it is shown
in Refs. [4, 5] that information-theoretic phenomena
such as teleportation, no-cloning, the impossibility of
discriminating non-orthogonal states, the information-
disturbance trade-off, aspects of entanglement theory,
and many others, are found to be derivable within toy
theories that presume hidden variables and wherein the
analogue of ψ is a state of incomplete knowledge. This
interpretation of ψ is further supported by a great deal
of foundational work that does not presuppose hidden
variables [63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73]. ψ-
epistemic ontological models are therefore deserving of
more attention than they have received to date.
However, it remains unclear to what extent a ψ-
epistemic ontological model of quantum theory is even
possible. Recall that the Kochen-Specker model dis-
cussed in Sec. IID 3 secured such an interpretation
for pure states and projective measurements in a two-
dimensional Hilbert space. But can one be found in more
general cases? 21
We here need to dispense with a possible confusion
that might arise. In the same paper wherein they pre-
sented their 2d model, Kochen and Specker proceed to
prove a no-go theorem for certain kinds of ontological
models seeking to reproduce the predictions of quantum
mechanics in 3d Hilbert spaces. One might therefore be
led to the impression that Kochen and Specker rule out
ψ-epistemic models for 3d Hilbert spaces. This is not
the case, however, as we now clarify.
As soon as one moves to projective measurements in a
Hilbert space of dimension greater than two, it is possible
to define a distinction between contextual and noncon-
textual ontological models [1]. It was famously shown
by Bell [31] and independently by Kochen and Specker
[2] that noncontextual ontological models cannot repro-
duce the predictions of quantum theory for Hilbert space
dimension 3 or greater. Furthermore, the notion of non-
contextuality can be extended from projective measure-
ments to nonprojective measurements, preparations, and
transformations [1]. In all cases, one can demonstrate
a negative verdict for noncontextual models of quantum
theory [1]. Indeed, by moving beyond projective mea-
surements, one finds that noncontextual models cannot
even be constructed for a two-dimensional Hilbert space.
But the dichotomy between contextual and noncon-
textual models is independent of the dichotomy between
ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic models. So, whereas the Bell-
Kochen-Specker theorem and variants thereof show the
necessity of contextuality, these are silent on the issue of
whether one can find an ontological model that is also
ψ-epistemic. The ontological models of quantum theory
that we do have, such as deBroglie-Bohm, are contextual
but ψ-ontic. Bell [31] even provides a very ad hoc exam-
ple of a contextual hidden variable model (an extension
of the Bell-Mermin model of Sec. II D 2) to prove that
21 Hardy was perhaps the first to lay down this challenge explicitly
[74].
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such a model is possible. It too is ψ-ontic (although one
must have recourse to the definition appealing to fideli-
ties provided in footnote 10 to properly assess this model)
[75].
Many features of deBroglie-Bohm theory have been
found to be generalizable to a broad class of ontolog-
ical models. Nonlocality, contextuality, and signalling
outside of quantum equilibrium [76] are examples. In-
spired by this pattern, Valentini has wondered whether
the pilot-wave (and hence ontic) nature of the wave func-
tion in the deBroglie-Bohm approach might be unavoid-
able [77]. On the other hand, it has been suggested by
Wiseman that there exists an unconventional reading of
the deBroglie-Bohm approach which is not ψ-ontic [78].
A distinction is made between the quantum state of the
universe and the conditional quantum state of a subsys-
tem, defined in Ref. [79]. The latter is argued to be epis-
temic while the former is deemed to be nomic, that is,
law-like, following the lines of Ref. [80] (in which case it is
presumably a category mistake to try to characterize the
universal wave function as ontic or epistemic). We shall
not provide a detailed analysis of this claim here, but
highlight it as an interesting possibility that is deserving
of further scrutiny. Nelson’s approach to quantum the-
ory [81] also purports to not assume the wave function
to be part of the ontology of the theory [82]. However,
as pointed out by Wallstrom [83], the theory does not
succeed in picking out all and only those solutions of
Schro¨dinger’s equation22. Consequently, it also fails to
provide a ψ-epistemic model of quantum theory.
Recently, Barrett [75] has constructed a model that
is ψ-epistemic. Although it only works for a countable
set of bases of the Hilbert space, it seems likely that
this deficiency can be eliminated, in which case it would
be the first ψ-epistemic model for a Hilbert space of ar-
bitrary dimension. Unfortunately, the model achieves
the ψ-epistemic property in a very ad hoc manner, by
singling out a pair of non-orthogonal quantum states,
and demanding that the epistemic states associated with
these have non-zero overlap, while the quantum pre-
dictions are still reproduced. It consequently does not
have the sorts of features, outlined in Refs. [4, 5], that
make the ψ-epistemic approach compelling. This sug-
gests that the interesting question is not simply whether
a ψ-epistemic model can be constructed, but whether one
can be constructed with certain additional properties,
such as the property that the classical fidelity between
epistemic states associated with a given pair of quantum
states is invariant under all unitary transformations of
the latter.23
Rudolph has devised a ψ-epistemic contextual onto-
logical model that is quantitatively close to the predic-
tions of quantum theory for projective measurements in
three-dimensional Hilbert spaces and also has the desired
symmetry property [6]. This model does not, however,
reproduce the quantum predictions exactly.
It is possible that a ψ-epistemic model with the de-
sired symmetry property does not exist. However, a no-
go theorem always presumes some theoretical framework.
In Sec. II A of the present paper, we have cast ontolog-
ical models in an operational framework, wherein sys-
tems are considered in isolation and the experimental
procedures are treated as external interventions. Such
a framework may not be able to do justice to all inter-
pretations that have some claim to being judged realist.
For instance, in deBroglie-Bohm, a system is not separa-
ble from the experimental apparatus and consequently it
is unclear whether one misrepresents the interpretation
by casting it in our current framework (an extension of
the formalism used here is, however, to be developed in
Ref. [21]). Ontological models that are fundamentally re-
lational might also fail to be captured by the framework
described here. Nonetheless, something would undeni-
ably be learned if one could prove the impossibility of a
ψ-epistemic model with the desired symmetry properties
within an operational framework of this sort.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to acknowledge Jonathan Barrett,
Travis Norsen, and Howard Wiseman for discussions and
comments, and Don Howard and Arthur Fine for their
Einstein scholarship, without which the present work
would not have been possible. We are also grateful to
Terry Rudolph for numerous discussions on this work and
for having supported the progressive rock movement by
refusing to adopt a reasonable haircut. RWS acknowl-
edges support from the Royal Society. NH is supported
by Imperial College London and the occasional air-guitar
recital.
22 It is assumed that only continuous and single-valued wave func-
tions are valid, a fact that is disputed by Smolin [84].
23 The Kochen-Specker model discussed in Sec. IID 3 has this fea-
ture.
[1] R. W. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 71, 052108 (2005).
[2] S. Kochen and E. Specker, Journal of Mathematics and
Mechanics 17 (1967).
[3] L. Hardy, quant-ph/9906123 (1999).
[4] R. W. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 75, 032110 (2007).
[5] S. D. Bartlett, T. Rudolph, and R. W. Spekkens, unpub-
lished.
[6] T. Rudolph, quant-ph/0608120 v1 (2006).
[7] Ref [37], p. 72.
[8] Ref. [9], chap. 9.
[9] G. Bacciagaluppi and A. Valentini, Quantum theory at
the crossroads: Reconsidering the 1927 Solvay Confer-
17
ence, to be published by Cambridge University Press
(currently available at quant-ph/0609184).
[10] A. Peres, Fortschr. Phys. 51, 458 (2003).
[11] D. Howard, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
16, 171 (1985).
[12] A. Fine, Einstein’s Critique of Quantum Theory in [16].
[13] Ref. [64], p. 9.
[14] L. Hardy, in Fundamental Problems in Quantum Theory,
edited by D. M. Greenberger and A. Zeilinger (New York:
New York Academy of Sciences, 1995), p. 600.
[15] M. Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism:
A Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum Mechan-
ics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987), p. 78.
[16] A. Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the
Quantum Theory (University of Chigaco Press, Chicago,
1996), 2nd ed.
[17] T. Maudlin, Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity (Black-
well Publishing Ltd., Oxford, 2002), p. 140, 2nd ed.
[18] T. Norsen, Am. J. Phys. 73, 164 (2005).
[19] Ref. [37], p. 64.
[20] J. S. Bell, Physics 1, 195 (1964), reproduced in [85].
[21] N. Harrigan and T. Rudolph, in preparation.
[22] D. Bohm, Phys. Rev. 85, 166 (1952).
[23] K. Berndl, M. Daumer, S. G. D. Durr, and N. Zangh, Il
Nuovo Cimento 110B, 737 (1995).
[24] J. Vink, Phys. Rev. A 48, 1808 (1993), and Ref. [85],
chap. 19.
[25] S. Kochen, in Symposium on the Foundations of Modern
Physics, edited by P. Lahti and P. Mittelstaedt (World
Scientific, Singapore, 1985), p. 151.
[26] D. Dieks, Ann. Phys. 7, 174 (1988).
[27] R. Healey, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).
[28] D. Dieks and P. Vermaas, eds., The Modal Interpreta-
tion of Quantum Mechanics (Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, Boston, 1998).
[29] F. J. Belifante, A survey of hidden-variables theories
(Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1973).
[30] E. G. Beltrametti and S. Bugajski, J. Phys. A: Math.
Gen. 28, 3329 (1995).
[31] J. S. Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966), reproduced
in [85].
[32] N. D. Mermin, Rev. Mod. Phys. 65, 803 (1993).
[33] J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology, edited by
P. K. A. Sarlemijn (Elsevier Science Publishers, 1990),
reproduced in [85].
[34] Ref. [85], p. 53.
[35] J. S. Bell, TH-2053-CERN (1975), reproduced in [85].
[36] Einstein to Ehrenfest,- 11 January 1927, EA 10-152,
translated in [37], p. 84.
[37] D. Howard, in Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty: Histor-
ical, Philosophical and Physical Inquiries into the Foun-
dations of Quantum Mechanics. Proceedings of the 1989
Conference, “Ettore Majorana” Centre for Scientific Cul-
ture, International School of History of Science, Erice,
Italy, 5-14 August. (New York: Plenum, 1990), pp. 61–
111.
[38] Einstein to Ehrenfest, 18 June, 1926, EA 10-138, trans-
lated in [37], p. 83.
[39] Einstein to Sommerfeld, 21 August, 1926, in [86]. Trans-
lated in [37], p. 83.
[40] E. Schro¨dinger, Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 31, 555 (1935).
[41] T. Norsen, quant-ph/0601205 v2 (2006).
[42] Norsen, Foundations of Physics 37, 311 (2007), also avail-
able at quant-ph/0607057.
[43] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47,
777 (1935).
[44] Einstein to Schro¨dinger, 19 June 1935, extracts trans-
lated in [11].
[45] A. Einstein, Journal of the Franklin Institute 221, 313
(1936).
[46] Ref. [9], p. 488.
[47] A. Einstein, Dialectica 2, 320 (1948), translated in [11],
page 201.
[48] Einstein to Born 18 March 1948.
[49] Ref. [56], pp. 2-94.
[50] T. Sauer, to be published in Studies in his-
tory and philosophy of science. Available online at
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003222/.
[51] N. Bohr, Phys. Rev. 48, 696 (1935).
[52] M. D. Reid, Phys. Rev. A 40, 913 (1989).
[53] H. M. Wiseman, S. J. Jones, and A. C. Doherty, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 98, 140402 (2007).
[54] H. M. Wiseman, Contemporary Physics 47, 79 (2006).
[55] E. Schro¨dinger, Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 32, 451 (1936).
[56] P. A. Schilpp, ed., Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist
(Open Court, 1949).
[57] A. Einstein To George Breit, August 2, 1935, reproduced
in [87].
[58] A. Einstein to E. Cassirer, 16 March, 1937, translated in
[59] p. 262.
[59] A. Fine, Einstein’s Interpretations of Quantum Theory
in [88].
[60] A. Einstein to P. S. Epstein 10 November 1945, extract
published in [37], p. 103.
[61] A. Einstein to W. Heitler, 1948, translated in [59] p. 262.
[62] T. Norsen (AIP, 2006), vol. 844, pp. 281–293, also avail-
able at quant-ph/0408105 v3.
[63] J. V. Emerson, Ph.D. thesis (2001), available online at
quant-ph/0211035.
[64] C. A. Fuchs, quant-ph/0205039 v1 (2002).
[65] C. A. Fuchs, J. Mod. Opt. 50, 987 (2003).
[66] L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970).
[67] L. E. Ballentine, Y. Yang, and J. P. Zibin, Phys. Rev. A
50, 2854 (1994).
[68] R. Peierls, Surprises in Theoretical Physics (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1979).
[69] M. S. Leifer, quant-ph/0611233 v1 (2006).
[70] M. S. Leifer, Phys. Rev. A 74, 042310 (2006).
[71] C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack, J. Math. Phys.
43(9), 4537 (2002).
[72] C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack, Phys. Rev. A
65, 022305 (2002).
[73] C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack, quant-
ph/0608190 v2 (2006).
[74] L. Hardy, private communication.
[75] J. Barrett, private communication.
[76] A. Valentini, in Modality, Probability, and Bell’s Theo-
rems, edited by T. Placek and J. Butterfield (Kluwer,
2002).
[77] A. Valentini, private communication.
[78] H. Wiseman, private communication.
[79] D. Du¨rr, S. Goldstein, and N. Zangh`ı, Journal of Statis-
tical Physics 67, 843 (1992).
[80] D. Du¨rr, S. Goldstein, and N. Zangh`ı, in Experimental
Metaphysics — Quantum Mechanical Studies for Abner
Shimony, Volume One; Boston Studies in the Philosophy
of Science 193, Boston, edited by M. H. R. S. Cohen and
18
J. Stachel (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
[81] E. Nelson, Quantum Fluctuations (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1985).
[82] G. Bacciagaluppi, in Endophysics, time, quantum and the
subjective, edited by M. S. R. Buccheri and A. Elitzur
(World Scientific Publishing, London, 2005), pp. 367–
388.
[83] T. C. Wallstrom, Phys. Rev. A 49, 1613 (1994).
[84] L. Smolin, quant-ph/0609109 v1 (2006).
[85] J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Me-
chanics (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[86] A. Hermann, ed., Albert Einstein/Arnold Sommerfeld.
Briefwechsel. Sechzig Briefe aus dem goldenen Zeital-
ter der modernen Physik (Schwabe & Co., Basel and
Stuttgart, 1968).
[87] A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown Pub-
lishing Co., 1954).
[88] M. Beller, R. S. Cohen, and J. Renn, eds., Einstein in
Context (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
